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We consider tax competition in a world with tax bases exhibiting different degrees of mobility, modeled as 
mobile and immobile capital. An agreement among countries not to give preferential treatment to mobile 
capital results in an equilibrium where mobile capital is nevertheless taxed relatively lightly. In particular, 
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A theme running through the tax competition literature is that
jurisdictions face incentives to compete for mobile capital by reducing
their tax rates. As a result, tax competition leads to inefﬁciently low tax
rates andpublic goodprovisionwhengovernments arewelfarist, butmay
constrain the excessive size of governments that act as Leviathans.1 One
might question the tax-reducing effects of tax competition when
examining the effective average capital tax rates in the European Union
for the year 1991, which we report in Table 1.2 Indeed, note that most of
the countries are distributed around an average of 32% – with some
variance, possibly explained by differences in preferences for publicly
providedgoods–while on theotherhand, a considerably lower tax rateof
only 11% is in effect in Ireland.3 An interpretation of such facts is that
Irelandwasundercutting the other countries,while the rest seemed to actas if it was business as usual. Intuitively, if a country has a comparative
advantage at lowering its tax rate to attract mobile capital, it will
specialize in this activity. However, the rest of the countries will not
attempt to attractmobile capital, andwill instead focus on their immobile
base to ﬁnance their expenditures.
The current paper develops a model of this asymmetric policy
response to capital mobility. Countries are assumed to differ in their
supplies of an immobile tax base. Taxing this base affects its size, but
not the country in which it is located. An interpretation is that some
ﬁrms have already sunk investments in their host countries, limiting
their abilities to relocate in another country, but these ﬁrms are able
to adjust their investment levels within their host countries. All
countries have an opportunity to attract mobile capital by reducing
their tax rates. This presence of both mobile and immobile capital in
the model is consistent with evidence that while capital is becoming
increasingly mobile, a large portion of capital is still subject to limited
mobility, as discussed in Gordon and Bovenberg (1996).
We ﬁrst analyze a non-preferential regime, where each country taxes
its mobile and immobile capital at the same rate. Recent policy initiatives
have made this case increasingly relevant. In particular, the OECD has
become interested inwhat it calls “harmful taxpractices”. InOECD(1998),
two sorts of country behavior are viewed as harmful: (a) to impose no or
very low taxes on some bases; and (b) to have some preferential features
in the tax system that allowpart of a given base to escape taxation. For the
second sort of behavior, the preferential tax regimes often consist of the
foreign-owned portion of a tax base being taxed at a lower rate than the
domestic-owned portion, a behavior that is also labeled “discrimination”.
7 The term “tax haven” is being applied here to countries that offer low tax rates on
real capital investments, rather than countries that facilitate income-shifting for the
purpose of reducing taxable income in high-tax countries, independently of the
location of physical investments. Slemrod and Wilson (forthcoming) analyze tax
competition in the latter setting and conclude that tax havens worsen the tax
competition problem, resulting in lower levels of welfare.
8 In 2000 the OECD published a list of 35 countries called “non-cooperating tax
havens,” giving them a year to enact fundamental reform of their tax systems and
broaden the exchange of information with tax authorities or face economic sanctions.
Most of those 35 countries agreed to comply, but a few resisted until recently.
However, in April 2009, the countries of the G20 met and addressed explicitly the
“problem” of tax havens in the ﬁnal communiqué of the summit. A few days later, all of
the blacklisted tax havens had committed to comply to the OECD's Memorandum of
Understanding agreeing to transparency and exchange of information.
9 Janeba and Smart (2003) generalize both the Janeba–Peters and Keen results to more
general settings. But they alsomust restrict the relevant elasticities to ensure the existence
Table 1
Effective average tax rate on capital and productivity of capital, for the EU and US.
Effective average tax
rate on capital (%)
Productivity of capital
(as % of that in US)
1981 1991 1983
Austria 21.5 22.7 0.56
Belgium 39.5 36.0 0.66
Denmark 47.8 40.0 0.72
Finland 35.2 45.2 0.66
France 28.4 24.8 0.63
West Germany 31.0 26.5 0.68
Ireland 11.4 11.1 0.49
Italy 25.3 34.5 0.53
Netherlands 29.7 31.9 0.77
Spain 13.9 20.3 0.53
Sweden 47.4 53.1 0.97
United Kingdom 66.5 45.3 0.84
EU average 33.1 32.6 0.67
United States 40.9 41.1 1.00
Notes: For the effective average tax rate on capital, “EU average” is that of all countries
of the EU. For the productivity of capital, “EU average” is that of the countries listed in
this table.
Sources: Effective average tax rate on capital: Sørensen (2000, Table 2) or Hauﬂer
(2001, Table 4.1). Productivity of capital: Treﬂer (1993, Table 1).
2Some countries – e.g. Canada and the US – have signed mutually
advantageous tax treaties, whichwould be jeopardized if one or the other
actor were to start discriminating. And the prohibition of the asymmetric
treatment of foreign and domestic ﬁrms has been included in treaties in
the EU and the OECD. Both the OECD and the EU are active in trying to
reduce the extent of discrimination among their members.4
Within our framework, we show that only the two smallest
countries compete for mobile capital by reducing their tax rates
(assuming there are at least three countries); the rest are content to
maximize the revenue obtained from the immobile base.5 This result
is proven for a simultaneous-move Nash game, but we similarly ﬁnd
that only the smallest country competes and obtains mobile capital in
the sequential-move game. These results have both positive and
normative implications, which we next describe.
Onepositive implication is that it is the relatively small countries that
signiﬁcantly lower their tax rates in an effort to attract capital. Empirical
studies of tax havens like the one by Dharmapala and Hines (2006)
conﬁrm this prediction. In their comprehensive study, they conﬁrm the
fact thatmost tax havens tend to be small. They alsoﬁnd that tax havens
tend to be better governed, but for simplicity we abstract from such
issue in our paper.
Another positive implication of our results is that tax rates should
be considerably higher in most other countries. Table 1 conﬁrms this
ﬁnding. Chen, Mintz and Tarasov (2007) also comment on the fact
that most of the countries with high GDP set high corporate income
taxes, often exceeding thirty percent. Our results also help explain the
evidence presented by Hines (2005) that corporate tax collections did
not decline as a percentage of GDP between 1982 and 1999, despite
increasing capital mobility.6 He attributes this ﬁnding to a switch in
tax burdens from mobile capital to immobile capital, along with an
extension of domestic tax bases. But our study suggests that most
countries will choose not to compete for mobile capital, in which case
increasing mobility need not alter their behavior. Moreover, the
ﬁnding that most countries set the same tax rates is consistent with4 On this, see OECD (1998).
5 Note that in the asymmetric tax competition literature, small countries have more
incentive to lower their tax rate, while larger countries set higher tax rates. The
intuition for such a result is that smaller countries face a more elastic tax base so they
set lower tax rates. See Bucovetsky (1991), Kanbur and Keen (1993), and Wilson
(1991).
6 Note however that for the US, corporate tax collections seem to have declined
rapidly between 1960 and 1982. On this, see Auerbach (2005).the lack of correlation between country size and tax rates. Hines
(2005) observes that this correlation had largely disappeared by 1999.
On the normative side, our study addresses the debate about the
relative merits of non-preferential and preferential tax regimes. When
countries are allowed to individually levy different tax rates on
immobile and mobile capital, tax havens do not emerge in our model,
but tax competition for mobile capital intensiﬁes, causing a large
revenue loss in the form of lower tax rates on mobile capital.7 We
conclude that tax competition in the non-preferential regime leads to a
lower aggregate loss in tax revenue, compared with tax competition in
the preferential regime. The superiority of the non-preferential regime
in terms of tax revenue does not require assumptions about whether
countries choose their tax rates simultaneously or sequentially. But in all
cases, it is only the smallest country that beneﬁts from an expected
increase in revenue under the non-preferential regime. The other
countries are equally well-off under both regimes. Thus, the non-
preferential regime is better from the viewpoint of total revenue, but
only because it enables the smallest country to beneﬁt from acting as a
tax haven. Thus, fears that the lack of regulation of preferential tax
initiatives will cause widespread harm are perhaps unfounded.
Moreover, to the extent that this regulation leads to the creation of
tax havens, it conﬂicts with another OECD initiative to limit tax havens.8
Our results also shed light on the theoretical literature on preferential
versus non-preferential regimes. This literature gives conﬂicting results.
Janeba and Peters (1999) show that the elimination of preferential
regimes leads to higher total levels of tax revenue. On the other hand,
Keen (2001) reaches the opposite conclusion. They both analyze
simultaneous-move Nash games in tax rates, but their models contain
important differences. Janeba and Peters consider two countries that
differ in their supplies of an immobile “domestic tax base,” whereas a
second base is inﬁnitely elastic with respect to differences in tax rates: it
locates in the lowest-tax country. In contrast, Keen assumes that both
countries are completely identical and have access to two tax bases that
are partially mobile to different degrees. Wilson (2005b) observes,
however, that if one of the tax bases in Keen's paperweremade inﬁnitely
elastic, as in Janeba and Peters, then a symmetric equilibrium in pure
strategies would not exist under the non-preferential regime. By
analyzing a mixed-strategy equilibrium, the current paper is able to
pinpoint the absence of size differences across jurisdictions, along with
restrictions on the elasticity of the tax base, as the driving forces behind
Keen's results.9 But for the non-preferential case, we also ﬁnd thatof equilibria in pure strategies. Wilson (2005b) considers only symmetric equilibria for
identical countries, whereas the focus of the current paper is on the emergence of low-tax
countries (tax havens). Konrad (2007) also studies mixed-strategy equilibria for a 2-
country model, but his focus is on the ability of countries to alter the relative sizes of the
mobile and immobile tax bases by undertaking costly activities to increase citizen loyalty.
Finally, Peralta, Wauthy and van Ypersele (2006) examine themixed-strategy equilibria of
a game in which two countries compete to attract a monopolistic producer. The countries
may ﬁnd it advantageous not to strictly monitor proﬁt shifting as a way to attract
multinational ﬁrms while maintaining higher effective tax rates on domestic ﬁrms. This
result amounts to showing that countries forced to use a non-preferential regimemay ﬁnd
ways to introduce preferential treatment for some ﬁrms by the back door.
3expected tax revenue is lower for the smallest country under the
simultaneous-move game than under the sequential-move game, while
no country obtains higher expected revenue under the sequential-move
game. As a result, we should not be surprised if we ﬁnd that mixed
strategies are not played in practice.
The results reported above, alongwith previous literature, focus on
how total tax revenue compares between the different tax regimes.
But we later extend the analysis to also address the question of the
efﬁcient allocation of capital, which, in our model, amounts to the
efﬁcient location of capital. In particular, countries are allowed to
possess different productivities. For non-preferential regimes, an
intriguing result is that for countries of equal size, it may be one with
low productivity that will set the lowest tax rate. The same intuition
applies: a country with low productivity generates less tax revenues
from its immobile tax base, and can consequently be more aggressive.
This implies that mobile capital may have the tendency to inefﬁciently
locate in less productive countries. Depending on the size of these
productivity differences, this result could counteract the superior
revenue-raising capabilities of non-preferential regimes. Table 1 also
reports some data on the productivity of capital. Our explanation
could account for the case of Ireland — low productivity and low tax
rates, and could also help explain the low tax rate chosen by Spain in
1981. Our explanation is also supported by the fact that as Spain's
productivity rose in the eighties, so did its tax rate.10 Note that overall,
the correlation between the 1981 tax rates and the 1983 capital
productivity is strongly positive at 0.848.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we ﬁrst
describe the basic model, with countries of different sizes and no
productivity differences. For the case where all countries choose their
tax rates simultaneously, we show in Section 3 that there exists a
unique simultaneous-move Nash equilibrium in which the smallest
two countries play mixed strategies, with their tax rates undercutting
the tax rates chosen by the remaining countries. Thus, these two
countries obtain all of the mobile capital in equilibrium. We also
analyze the case where all countries are identical, ﬁnding that there
also exist equilibria where more than two countries play mixed
strategies and obtain the mobile capital. In Section 4, we introduce a
sequential-move game in which each country chooses its tax rate in a
speciﬁc, randomly determined, order. As noted above, this game
produces only a single tax haven and leads to higher global tax
revenue than the simultaneous-move game. Section 5 contains the
comparison between preferential and non-preferential regimes, along
with extending the analysis to the case where countries possess
different productivities. Section 6 concludes.11 For heuristic reasons, we introduce a different breaking rule when the game is
sequential.
12 Our results would obtain even if the assumption that all investments are bunched
were relaxed. In our framework, we simply assume that the marginal product of
capital is constant in a given country. Departing from the standard assumption of a
declining marginal product of capital is frequent in the literature and simpliﬁes our
analysis. For papers which investigate the case in which capital tends to agglomerate2. The basic model
We consider a variation of the model introduced by Janeba and
Peters (1999), but important differences will emerge. Imagine an
economy with J≥2 countries or regions indexed by j, j=1,…, J. In
contrast to JanebaandPeters (1999), aswell as to thebulk of theexisting
related literature likeAndersson andKonrad (2001),Wilson (2005b), or
Konrad (2007), our general framework allows for the possibility ofmore
than two countries competing formobile capital. Also,wewill derive the
relation between tax payments and tax rates for a ﬁrm located in a
particular country, whereas Janeba and Peters (1999) assume a tax
function with particular properties. Our approach allows us to
investigate what happens when these properties are not satisﬁed.
In each country or region, a representative citizen owns a
constant-return-to-scale technology, F(K)=γK, with γ>0, which
transforms capital into output. Capital owners can be local or mobile.10 Data on total factor productivity for Spain in the eighties can be found in Aiyar and
Dalgaard (2001).In particular, the world is populated byMmobile capital owners, who
can freely invest in any of the J countries, whereas in country j, there
are Nj local capital owners, who invest only in j. As discussed in the
introduction, the capital owned by local owners may be viewed as
prohibitively costly to relocate to another country, perhaps because of
previous sunk investments in the host country, whereas mobile
capital is freely mobile. With these interpretations, it is reasonable to
treat mobile and immobile capital as perfect substitutes.
Capital bears a per unit tax of tj in country j. Given the constant-
return-to-scale technology in each country, the net return on capital
in country j is then simply (γ− tj). The owners of local capital can
adjust to taxation by increasing or decreasing the size of their capital
investment, denoted I. The owners of mobile capital can also adjust
the size of their investment, but they also choose to locate this
investment in a country that offers them the highest net return. Any
such country has the lowest tax rate, i.e. country g if min {tj}j=1
J = tg.
For now, we assume that if S countries have chosen the same lowest
tax rate, then all mobile capital owners invest in a country belonging
to this set with probability 1/S.11 Thus, all of mobile capital always
ends up in a single country (i.e. capital investment is bang-bang), and
the other countries obtain nothing.12
The general timing of events in this world is as follows. First,
countries choose their tax rates tj, j=1,…, J. Note that the tax rate in a
given country applies to the two types of capital; discriminating is
simply assumed to be impossible. Second, the owners of mobile
capital select the country in which they will invest. Third and ﬁnally,
owners of local andmobile capital choose the size of their investment.
We will in turn consider the case where the countries play
simultaneously, and that in which they play sequentially, so the ﬁrst
stage will later be decomposed into J sub-stages.
Owners of capital located in i (be it local ormobile) adjust the size of
their investment to maximize their net consumption, which is simply
the total return on their investmentminus the cost of investment, given
by c(I), with c′>0 and c″>0. Thus, for capital owners in j, the optimal
size of their investment is:
IðtjÞ = arg max
I
ðγ−tjÞI−cðIÞ:
Of course, given that the owners of mobile capital have decided to
invest in j, the problem faced by the owners of local capital and those
of mobile capital is identical. The ﬁrst-order condition characterizing
the investment decision I(tj) is (γ− tj)−c′(I)=0. Using it, we easily
ﬁnd that I′(tj)=−1/c″(I)<0.
Givenour focus on the revenueeffects of tax competition, it is natural
to assume that tax revenue plays a prominent role in government
objectives. For simplicity, we assume that governments maximize
revenue, butwe later argue that our analysis holdsmore generally.13 Let
mj be an indicator function which takes a value of 1 if all mobile capital
owners invest in country j, and a value of 0 if they have opted for any
other country. Thus, tax revenue for country j is tj[Nj+Mmj]I(tj).We
denote byWj(t,m) the tax revenue in country jwhen it has chosen tax
rate t and when the indicator variable takes a value of m. This taxbecause of an increasing marginal product, see Baldwin and Krugman (2004),
Boadway, Cuff and Marceau (2004), or Kind, Knarvik and Schjelderup (2000).
13 Note that Janeba and Peters (1999), a paper which is close to ours, consider a
world in which governments maximize tax revenues. Edwards and Keen (1996),
Kanbur and Keen (1993), Keen (2001), or Wilson (2005b) make this same assumption.
16 Also note that the equilibrium of our game is reminiscent of the equilibrium
obtained in duopoly pricing games with capacity constraints, e.g. Levitan and Shubik
Fig. 1. The payoffs.
4revenue function is equivalent to the primitive tax revenue function
deﬁned in Janeba and Peters (1999). Thus, we have:
Wjðt;1Þ = t½Nj + MIðtÞ;
Wjðt;0Þ = tNjIðtÞ:
For future use, denote by t ̂ the tax rate that maximizes Wj(t, 0)
and Wj(t, 1).14 Also note that Wj(t, 0)=Wj(t, 1)=0 at both t=0
and some t¯¯>t ̂, where t¯¯ is the tax rate inducing zero investment
(I=0) by capital owners.15 Finally, we deﬁne t j̃<t ̂ as the tax rate
solving Wj(t ̃j, 1)=Wj(t ̂, 0), i.e. t ̃jI(tj̃)(M+Nj)= t ̂I(t ̂)Nj. This implies
that each country has a speciﬁc t ̃j, that t ̃j=0 when Nj=0, and that t ̃j
increases when Nj increases. The payoff functions of a given country
are represented in Fig. 1.
Irrespective of where mobile capital ends up locating, global tax
revenue, summedacross all countries, ismaximizedwhen tax rates are set
at tj=t ̂ ∀j, j=1,…, J. Thus, because all locations are equivalent, the sole
inefﬁciency that can arise, and that onwhichwe ﬁrst want to focus, is the
under-taxation of capital. In Section 5, we allow the productivity of
investment to vary between countries, thereby making some locations
better than others, and introducing the possibility of an inefﬁcient
location.
3. Equilibrium of the simultaneous-move game
Consider ﬁrst two special cases that are interesting and useful to
understand.
In the ﬁrst special case, there are no mobile capital owners, so
M=0. In this case, because there is no mobile factor over which the
countries can ﬁght, global tax revenue is maximized. In particular,
governments set tj=t ̂ ∀ j, j=1,…, J, and each country obtains
revenue Wj(t ̂,0), j=1,…, J.
As a second special case, suppose there is somemobile capital but no
local capital, so Nj=0, j=1,…, J. In such a case, competition will drive
tax rates to zero, and no revenue will be generated in equilibrium. This
equilibrium is obviously the worse possible outcome in this world.
Note that the allocation in these two special cases does not depend
on the timing of the game or on the relative size of the countries.
Obviously, in the absence of mobile capital owners, the timing is
irrelevant since the decisions made by the countries are essentially14 Note that given the present formulation of the model, t ̂ maximizes both Wj(t, 0)
and Wj(t, 1).
15 The exact value of t¯¯ depends on the c(I) function. For example, if c(I)= I2, then
t¯¯=γ.independent. As for the case where there is only mobile capital, the
equilibrium features zero revenue regardless of the timing.
The general casewe nowwant to consider is one inwhich there are J
countries differing in their number of local capital owners. Without loss
of generality, suppose that N1≥N2≥…≥NJ. Three preliminary results
turnout to beuseful. Theproofs of all lemmasandpropositions are in the
Appendix.
Lemma 1. Country i never chooses a strategy ti>t ̂.
Note that t ̂ is independent of the relative size of Ni and M, so that
the same upper bound on strategies applies to the countries whether
they are identical or different. Lemma 1 simply states that it does not
pay to play a tax rate above t ̂, because a lower tax rate can increase tax
revenue and the likelihood of attracting mobile capital.
Lemma 2. Country i never chooses a strategy ti<t ̃i.
For a given tax rate ti∈ [tĩ, t]̂, a country is better off when all mobile
capital is invested in it. If the tax rate is lower than t ĩ, the country prefers
to drop off the race and at least getWi(t ,̂ 0). Recall that each country has
a speciﬁc t ĩ, and from Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we now know that the
relevant strategy space for country i is the subset of the real line [tĩ, t]̂.
Lemma 3. The game has no pure strategy equilibrium.
To understand why there is no pure strategy equilibrium, consider
an example in which there are only two countries, 1 and 2, with
N1>N2, implying that t ̃1>t ̃2. From this last inequality, it is clear that
country 2 can always undercut country 1. Yet, it is impossible to ﬁnd a
pair of tax rates (t1, t2) which would constitute an equilibrium. For
any t1∈ [t1̃, t ̂], country 2's best response is to set t2 to just undercut t1
(to attract mobile capital). However, given such a t2, country 1's best
response is also to undercut country 2. For t1=t1̃, country 2's best
response is again to set t2 arbitrarily close to t1 (t2∈ [t2̃, t1̃] is possible
for that). However, given such a t2, country 1's best response is to play
t ̂. Finally, for t1=t ̂, country 2's best response is to set t2 arbitrarily
close to t ̂. However, given such a t2=t ̂, country 1's best response is to
undercut country 2. Thus, such a game has no pure strategy
equilibrium. The argument just developed can be extended to a
game with J countries. In contrast, Janeba and Peters (1999) are able
to solve for a pure strategy equilibrium by assuming that their tax
revenue functions are such that t 1̃ is larger than t 2̂. In our context, this
would require sufﬁcient heterogeneity in the investment function
across countries. Instead of making this assumption, however, we will
face the challenge of investigating more complex equilibria.
We are now in a position to characterize the equilibrium of the
game. Note that the framework developed in the current paper bears
important similarities with that of an all-pay auction, i.e. an auction in
which the highest bidder obtains the object for sale and, more
importantly, in which all bidders pay their bid to the auctioneer. As it
turns out, our results below have the ﬂavor of those found in Baye
et al. (1996), who characterize equilibrium in an all-pay auction.16We
here present the case in which N1>N2>…>NJ because the general
case with N1≥N2≥…≥NJ is heavy in terms of notation. However, we
present the case in which N1=N2=…=NJ in Proposition 2.
Proposition 1. In a world with J countries differing in their number of
local capital owners (say N1>N2>…>NJ), the game has a unique mixed
strategyNash equilibrium inwhich the equilibriumstrategies are as follows.(1972) and Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). Varian (1980) characterizes a similar
equilibrium in his work on Bertrand price competition when some of the ﬁrms'
customers are captive. Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) examine the existence of
equilibrium in general discontinuous economic games. They ﬁnd the conditions under
which the equilibrium involves a mixed strategy similar to those obtained here.
17 This is because the t j̃s do not change whenM and all the Njs are doubled. It follows
that the equilibrium remains the same.
  5◊ Countries j=1,…, J−2: play t ̂ with probability qj=1.
◊ Country J−1: with positive probability qJ−1∈(0, 1), plays t ̂; with
positive probability (1−qJ−1), plays the interval [t ̃J−1, t ̂] with
continuous probability distribution HJ−1(t), with:
qJ−1 = 1−
WJð tˆ;1Þ−WJð t˜J−1;1Þ
WJð tˆ;1Þ−WJð tˆ;0Þ
" #
HJ−1ðtÞ =
½WJðt;1Þ−WJð t˜J−1;1Þ½WJð tˆ;1Þ−WJð tˆ;0Þ
½WJðt;1Þ−WJðt;0Þ½WJð tˆ;1Þ−WJð t˜J−1;1Þ
:
◊ Country J: plays the interval [t J̃−1, t ̂] with continuous probability
distribution HJ(t), with:
HJðtÞ =
WJ−1ðt;1Þ−WJ−1ð tˆ;0Þ
WJ−1ðt;1Þ−WJ−1ðt;0Þ :
To understand Proposition 1, ﬁrst note that because N1>N2>…>
NJ−1>NJ, we have 0<t J̃<t ̃J−1<…<t ̃2<t ̃1<t ̂. The ranking of the t j̃s
reﬂects the capacity of each country to undercut its opponents. This
ranking has a straightforward implication: smaller countries can
undercut larger countries. Indeed, the equilibrium described in
Proposition 1 is one in which all countries but the two smallest ones
(J−1 and J) put themselves out of the race to attract mobile capital by
taxing at rate t ̂with probability one. Country J−1 puts some mass (<1)
on t,̂ but it also randomizes over the interval [tJ̃−1, t]̂. Finally, country J
randomizes on [tJ̃−1, t]̂, and it never plays t.̂ It follows from these
strategies that mobile capital necessarily locates in country J−1 or J (the
only countries really participating in the tax competition), and that
mobile capital is never taxed at the revenue-maximizing tax rate t.̂ Global
revenue falls short of its maximum level becausemobile capital precisely
locates in the countries taxing capital at rates below t.̂ Of course, there is a
revenue loss also because immobile capital is taxed at a rates below t ̂ in J
(for sure) and J−1 (with probability 1−qJ−1). In equilibrium, the
expectedpayoff of all countries except J is equal towhat theyobtainwhen
unable to attract mobile capital and taxing immobile capital at t,̂ i.e. the
expected payoff for j=1,…,J−1 isWj(tj̃, 1)=Wj(tĵ, 0). The sole country
that does better is country J, the smallest one. It obtains and expected
payoff ofWJ(t J̃−1, 1)>WJ(tJ̃, 1)=WJ(t ,̂ 0), because tJ̃−1>tJ̃.
As for the uniqueness of the equilibrium, the intuition revolves
around the fact that if another equilibriumwas to exist, it would require
the active participation of more than two countries in the race to attract
mobile capital. But, as we show in the proof, if there are more than two
active countries, then it is not possible to construct a mixed strategy
equilibrium. Indeed, in such a case, it is impossible to ensure that all
active participants are indifferent between the pure strategies they play
with strictly positive probability. Note that equivalent uniqueness
results are obtained in Hillman and Riley (1989) and Baye et al. (1996).
It is useful at this point to introduce a measure of the revenue loss
from tax competition. There are of course several ways in which this
could be done. We use what we think is a simple and natural measure,
the ex ante expected foregone tax revenue as a proportion of maximum
tax revenue, and we denote it by Φ. Maximum revenue is obtained
when all countries tax all capital at rate t.̂ Thus, maximum revenue is
M tˆIð tˆÞ +∑Ji = 1Wið tˆ;0Þ. Further,we know fromour characterization
of the equilibrium that all countries obtain, in expected terms,Wj(t,̂ 0),
except for country J, which obtains WJ(tJ̃−1, 1). It follows that our
measure Φ is given by:
Φ =
WJð tˆ;1Þ−WJð t˜J−1;1Þ
M tˆIð tˆÞ +∑Ji = 1Wið tˆ;0Þ
:
It should be clear that although only two countries are effectively
competing for mobile capital, all mobile capital is taxed at rates below
the revenue-maximizing level, so our measure of expected revenueloss, Φ, grows larger when M increases relative to the Njs. Note also
that if the size of the economy was doubled (e.g.M and all the Njs are
doubled), then the equilibrium tax rates would not change,17 but the
absolute value of foregone expected tax revenues would double,
leaving Φ unchanged. In next section, we will compare the expected
revenue loss associated with tax competition under sequential play
with that under simultaneous play.
The special case in which the J countries are identical yields some
interesting insights.
Proposition 2. If the J countries are identical (Nj=N, ∀j), the game has
a large number of mixed strategy Nash equilibria. For any Q where
0≤Q≤ J−2, there exists an equilibrium with Q countries playing t ̂ with
probability 1, and J−Q countries playing t ∈[t ̃, t ̂] according to the
continuous cumulative function H(t) and density function h(t)=H′(t)
on [t ̃, t ̂]. For t ∈[t ̃, t ̂], the mixed strategy H(t) is given by:
HðtÞ = 1− Wð tˆ;0Þ−Wðt;0Þ
Wðt;1Þ−Wðt;0Þ
" #1= ðJ−Q−1Þ
:
In equilibrium, the expected payoff of all countries is W(t ̂, 0).
The following points are worth mentioning. First, if there are more
than two countries, then a positive number of them can be playing the
revenue-maximizing tax rate, t ̂, with probability one. Second, if there
are only two countries, then both will play a lower tax rate with a
probability approaching one (none will put mass on t ̂). Third, the
equilibria are all equivalent in terms of expected revenue. Indeed, our
measure of ex ante expected revenue loss, Φ, in the particular context
of Proposition 2, yields:
Φ=
Wð tˆ;1Þ−Wð tˆ;0Þ
M tˆIð tˆÞ + JWð tˆ;0Þ
:
All equilibria entail the same Φ, as all countries obtain the same
expected payoffW(t,̂ 0). Note that since, in the context of Proposition 1,
country J does better than WJ(t,̂ 0), it follows that introducing some
heterogeneity in the Nj's reduces expected revenue losses, as measured
byΦ.
4. Equilibrium of the sequential-move game
We now examine the case in which countries play sequentially in
the ﬁrst stage of the overall game. Let J be the set of countries,
containing J countries, each indexed by j, as was the case above.
Without loss of generality, suppose that N1≥N2≥…≥NJ−1≥NJ. From
our discussion above, it must then be that t ̃1≥ t ̃2≥…≥ t ̃J−1≥ t ̃J. We
assume that countries play sequentially, one after the other, but in an
order that is independent of a country index j. It is possible to envision
that before the countries play, nature chooses with probability 1/J! an
order of play among the J! possible orders of play.
Before going further, it is useful to re-formulate our tie breaking rule
for the case in which S countries have chosen the same lowest tax rate.
Our assumption is that in such a case, all mobile capitalM locates in the
country with the largest index j. For example, if countries 2, 3, and 7
have set the lowest tax rate, then M locates in country 7. Such an
assumption reﬂects the fact that because t j̃ is lower (not larger) for a
higher index j (because it has a smallerNj), the countrywith the highest
index is that which could ultimately undercut every other countries.
In this sequential game, Lemmas 1 and 2 still hold, so for each
country, equilibrium strategies must belong to the real line [t ̃j, t ̂]. Let
aj, j=1,…, J−1, be an indicator function which takes a value of 1 if
18 Note however that if a country i's productivity is too low (i.e. γi<maxj{γj− t ̃j}j≠ i),
then this country will simply be unable to attract mobile capital at a positive tax rate.
Such a possibility is reminiscent of the analysis of Cai and Treisman (2005), in which
countries of too low productivity are simply unable to compete for mobile capital.
6country j chooses its tax rate after country J, and a value of 0 if it
chooses it before. We denote byA⊂J the set of countries who choose
their tax rate after J : A = fj∈J jaj = 1g. The following can be
obtained.
Proposition 3. If t˜J = minft˜j; j∈Jg, then the subgame perfect
equilibrium of the tax competition game is a strategy proﬁle (t1⁎,…, tJ⁎)
in which all countries play the revenue-maximizing tax rate (tj⁎= t ̂,
∀j≠ J), except for country J, which plays t⁎J = minf t˜k jk∈Ag, unless
ðA = ∅Þ. If country J plays last ðA = ∅Þ, then tJ⁎=t ̂.
Thus, in all equilibria, mobile capital locates in country J, the one
which can undercut every other country. The presence of smallest
country J disciplines all the larger countries, making it useless for
them to enter into active tax competition and inducing them to
maximize the revenue yield of the immobile base. But the tax rates the
smallest country must play to attract mobile capital depend on the
order of moves. The worst case scenario occurs when country J−1
plays after country J ðJ−1∈AÞ. In this case, of course, tJ⁎=t J̃−1, and so
tJ⁎may be signiﬁcantly smaller than t ̂. The revenue loss stemming from
the under-taxation of capital may therefore be quite large. On the
other hand, the best-case scenario occurs when country J plays last
ðA = ∅Þ. In such a case, tJ⁎=t ̂, so global tax revenue is maximized.
Clearly, the nature of the revenue loss in the sequential game is the
same as that in the simultaneous game. Our results can therefore be
viewed as being robust to changes in the timing of the game.
However, there is only one country taxing capital below t ̂ in the
sequential game, and two in the simultaneous game. Also note that in
the sequential game, the equilibrium outcome is uncertain ex ante
because of the uncertainty regarding the order of play, not because the
countries play mixed strategies.
It turns out that calculating the appropriate measure of expected
revenue loss in the sequential game in the most general case of J
countries is fairly involved. However, we know that in this sequential
game, all countries obtain Wj(t,̂ 0) for all order of moves, except for J
which, in theworst case scenario,when country J−1plays after country
J, obtains a payoff ofWJ(t J̃−1,1) and does better for any other scenario in
which country J−1 plays before country J. Using our loss measure, Φ,
we can immediately recognize two points: (a) the level of loss in the
worst case scenario of the sequential game is equal to the expected loss
in the overall simultaneous game; and (b) this level of loss is less than
the expected loss in the simultaneous game for any other scenario of the
sequential game. Since theworst case scenario occurswith a probability
less than one in the sequential game, it follows that there is less revenue
loss on average in the sequential game than in the simultaneous game, a
result that is intuitive. Note however that the equilibrium outcome of
the simultaneous game could entail higher tax rates for some countries
and, therefore, larger payoffs.
5. Discussion
5.1. Varying productivities
As an extension to our analysis, we now want to examine the case
in which the productivity of investment varies across countries. Thus,
suppose that the technology in each country is given by Fj(K)=γjK,
with γj>0 being possibly different across countries. In this context,
full efﬁciency requires that all countries tax at rate t ĵ (which now
differs for different countries) and that mobile capital locates in the
most productive country, i.e. in the country with the highest γj.
In both the simultaneous and sequential games, characterizing the
equilibrium requires ordering the countries in terms of the most
advantageous net return they can offer γj−t j̃. Consider the case of a
sequential-move game. Fromwhat was shown in Section 4, it should be
clear that whatever the order of moves, mobile capital will locate in the
country that can offer the largest per unit return γj−t j̃. It follows thatcapitalwill locate inefﬁciently if the countrywith the largestγj−t j̃ is not
that with the largest γj. Obviously, γj−t j̃ is increasing in γj, but it is also
decreasing inNj because of the effectNjhas on t j̃. As in previous sections,
countries with a small endowment of immobile capital are willing to
reduce their tax rate more than countries with a large endowment.
Therefore, if the high-productivity countries are also those with a large
endowment of capital, it is then possible for mobile capital to
inefﬁciently locate in a low-productivity country.18 It can then be
shown that if there exists a country iwith γi<maxj{γj}j≠ i and aNi such
that γi− tĩ>maxj{γj− tj̃}j≠ i, then country i, because of its small
endowment of immobile capital, will attract mobile capital despite not
being themost productive country. In such a case, all countries tax at the
revenue-maximizing rate, tĵ, except country i, in which mobile capital
ends up locating. Thus, not only is there a revenue loss from the taxation
of mobile capital at too low a rate, but there is also the potential
inefﬁciency of capital locating in a country that is not the most
productive. In the simultaneous game, the same inefﬁciencies can be
present. Indeed, if two countries can offer a more advantageous net
beneﬁt γi−t ĩ than that offered by the most productive country, then
mobile capital will inefﬁciently locate in one of those two countries.
To summarize, the presence of small and less productive countries
generates two effects. On the one hand, small and less productive
countries discipline productive and large countries and induce them
to maximize the revenue yield of their immobile tax bases. On the
other hand, these small and less productive countries, by taxing
capital at lower tax rates, may end up with a disproportionately large
share (all of it in our analysis) of mobile capital because they are the
ones who have less to lose from low taxes.
5.2. Preferential versus non-preferential regimes
Wenowturn to a comparisonof preferential regimes– i.e. regimes in
which competing countries can set different tax rates on bases of
differing mobility – with non-preferential regimes — i.e. regimes in
which tax rates are constrained to be the same on all bases. The main
advantage of a preferential regime resides in the fact that governments
can avoid losing tax revenue on immobile tax bases by setting an
appropriately high tax rate on them,while competingmore aggressively
on themoremobile ones. On the other hand, a non-preferential regime
has the advantage of reducing competition on the mobile tax bases by
tying them to the more immobile ones. In other words, a non-
preferential regime makes it more costly for governments to lower
their tax rates and so reduces harmful tax competition. Depending on
the environment, one or the other regimemay be desirable. Janeba and
Peters (1999), in an environment entailing one perfectly mobile base
and one perfectly immobile base, show that a non-preferential regime
dominates a preferential regime. On the other hand, Keen (2001)
obtains the opposite result when two bases are at least partiallymobile.
Wilson (2005b) generalizes and attempts to reconcile these results
within a uniﬁed framework.
It turns out that the framework developed in this paper can be used
to contribute to this literature. We focus on the simple case in which all
countries are equally productive, but will also discuss the impact of
adding some heterogeneity toward the end. Since the equilibrium
properties depend on whether countries set their tax rates simulta-
neously or sequentially, we have to study each case in turn.
In the case of a simultaneous game, the equilibrium tax rates for
the non-preferential regime are the outcome of a mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium in which countries choose their tax rates in the manner
stated in Proposition 1. In equilibrium, the expected tax revenue of
each country is given by Wj(t ̂, 0) (the same amount they would
20 Wilson (1996) and Wildasin and Wilson (1996) construct dynamic models in
which factors are freely mobile when they decide on their initial location, but then
become partially immobile once they move there. In the ﬁrst paper, the factor is the
capital owned by inﬁnitely-lived ﬁrms, whereas an overlapping-generations model
7obtain by maximizing tax revenue from their immobile base only)
except for smallest country J which does better on average, obtaining
expected tax revenue WJ(t ̃J− 1,1)>WJ(t ̂, 0). In the case of a
preferential regime, the characterization of the equilibrium is a lot
simpler. Since tax rates on mobile and immobile capital are
disconnected, our framework can be viewed as a simple ﬁrst-price
auction.19 Thus, each country sets the revenue-maximizing tax rate t ̂
on its immobile base, and competition drives the tax rate on the
mobile base to zero. Tax revenue in that case is given byWj(t ̂, 0) for all
countries. It follows that in the case of a simultaneous game, a non-
preferential regime dominates on average a preferential one, since at
least one country (country J) earns higher ex ante expected tax
revenue. Note that such a comparison is based on the ex ante
difference in expected tax revenue. Of course, using ex post tax revenue
may not yield the same results. For example, under the non-preferential
regime, the two smallest (and active) countries are both potentially
picking tax rates below t.̂ The onewhich ex post picks the lowest tax rate
attracts the mobile capital and earns larger tax revenue that that it
would earn in the preferential regime. But the other country, thatwhich
fails to attract mobile capital, earns less tax revenue that it would earn
under the preferential regime. Thus, ex post in a non-preferential
regime, the winner's gain may or may not compensate for the loser's
loss, despite the fact that from an ex ante perspective, the expected gain
is clearly larger than the expected loss.
For the case of a sequential game, Proposition 3 establishes that in
a non-preferential regime, all countries obtain Wj(t ̂, 0) except for
country J which obtains at least WJ(t J̃−1)≥WJ(t ̂, 0) (with a strict
inequality if NJ<NJ−1) and even better in a potentially large number
of order of moves. The analysis of the preferential regime in the
sequential game is identical to that in the simultaneous case. All
countries set a tax rate t ̂ on immobile capital, but for the mobile base,
intense competition implies that the unique equilibrium is where all
countries set their tax rate at zero. The expected payoff for all
countries is therefore Wj(t ̂, 0). Thus, because at least one country
(country J) does better in the non-preferential regime, we again
conclude that a non-preferential regime dominates a preferential one.
The presence of heterogeneity in productivity gives rise to new
arguments in favour of preferential regimes. For a preferential regime
with equally productive countries, tax rates onmobile capital are driven
down to zero, and so the location decision of mobile capital becomes
purely random. With productivity differences, the most productive
country has an advantage, and is not constrained to offer a zero tax rate
in order to attract mobile capital. Assuming that country J is the most
productive, and that country J−1 is the secondmost productive, we can
deﬁne t⁎=γJ−γJ−1 as the highest possible tax rate country J can set
and still attractmobile capital, even if country J−1 has a zero tax rate. In
any simultaneous or sequential equilibrium, country J would pick tax
rate t⁎, andmobile capital would locate in themost productive country.
Turning to a non-preferential regime, recall from section 5.1 thatmobile
capital may locate inefﬁciently. It follows that non-preferential regimes
are better at reducing the under-taxation of capital, but that preferential
regimes are better at eliminating the inefﬁciency associated with the
wrong location of mobile capital.
Without differences in productivity, our analysis conﬁrms the
main result from Janeba and Peters (1999) that a non-preferential
regime generates more tax revenue. However, with productivity
differences, such non-preferential regimes can lead to inefﬁciencies in
the capital allocation across countries.
6. Conclusion
The current analysis could be extended in a few directions. First,
we could assume that governments care about new investment not19 Recall that in the case of a non-preferential regime, in which tax rates are tied, our
framework can be interpreted as an all-pay auction.only because of the resulting rise in tax revenue, but also because of
various external beneﬁts such as employment gains in desirable
occupations. Keen (2001) discusses such an extension in his analysis
of preferential and non-preferential regimes, showing that his
analysis can be generalized to encompass these additional beneﬁts.
Similarly, we may amend the objective function to read
Wjðt;1Þ = ðt + bÞ½Nj + MIðtÞ;
Wjðt;0Þ = ðt + bÞNjIðtÞ;
where b represents the external beneﬁt per unit of investment. This
extension reduces the tax rate that is optimal for a country in the absence
ofmobile capital: countries no longerwish tomaximize revenue, because
the investment loss resulting fromamarginal increase in the tax rate now
not only lowers the tax base, but also reduces the external beneﬁts
associatedwith investment. But the previous analysis goes throughwith t ̂
now redeﬁned in this manner. In particular, countries other than the two
smallest decide not to compete for capital and instead set their tax rates
equal to this t ̂ (Proposition 1). The other results are similarly extended.
Alternatively, the objective function may be speciﬁed as a weighted
sum of tax revenue and the producers' surplus received by the suppliers
of capital to a country. This extension recognizes that higher tax rates
harm capital owners by reducing their income from capital. Once again,
the analysis goes throughwith t ̂ reduced below its revenue-maximizing
level to reﬂect this harm. Presumably, the weight given to producers'
surplus would reﬂect the political inﬂuence of capital owners, perhaps
through lobbying activities. A more complex extension would be to
allow the beneﬁts of additional capital to differ between mobile and
immobile capital. This asymmetry complicates the calculation of mixed
strategies and is therefore left to future research.
Two other extensions appear to us as likely to generate interesting
results. The ﬁrst one would be to introduce labor and political
economy considerations in the analysis. Suppose that workers in each
country beneﬁt from the presence of productive capital because of the
associated larger output and wages, but also because capital is taxed
to ﬁnance the provision of a public good. Then, if capital is highly
mobile and unevenly owned by the workers of various countries, the
choice of tax rates on capital in a given country will be driven by
strategic international considerations, as in the current paper, but also
by the distribution of capital ownership within the country.
A second extension of the current analysis would be to use the
framework of Section 4 as the within-period game of a multi-period
dynamic game.20 To simplify, assume that both investors and govern-
ments are myopic. Also assume that the countries have the same
productivity, but that they differ in terms of their number of local capital
owners. Further, suppose that Mt new mobile investors are born each
period and that the location decision they make at that time is
irreversible — in effect, mobile investors locate and transform them-
selves into local capital investors. Hence, suppose that at time t, the
countries have local capital (N1,t,…, Nℓ,t,…, NJ,t). Then, from our previous
analysis, andwhatever the order of moves within period t, if country ℓ is
thatwith the smallest amount of local capital investors, capital investors
Mt then end up locating in country ℓ at time t. Assuming investors are
inﬁnitely-lived, it follows that at time t+1, the countries will have local
capital investors (N1,t+1=N1,t,…, Nℓ,t+1=Nℓ,t+Mt,…, NJ,t+1=NJ,t). Of
course, it will again be the country with the smallest number of local
capital investors that will attract mobile capital investors Mt+1. If this
process continues, the smaller countries will become larger –while thewith mobile labor is considered in the second paper. Both papers focus on only
preferential regimes, whereas our ongoing research involves a dynamic analysis of
non-preferential regimes.
8large ones will stagnate – and all countries will evolve to be
approximately of the same size.21 Thus, the environment considered in
this paper can generate convergence in the amount of capital located in
all countries. However, such a convergence does not seem to be
happening in the real world. We speculate that if investors and/or
governments were forward-looking – instead of being myopic – then
convergence would not necessarily obtain. These extensions of the
current paper will be examined in future work.
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Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
For any ti′>t,̂ there exists a ti″<t ̂ such thatWi(ti″,m)=Wi(ti′,m), for
m∈{0, 1}. Of course, since under ti″, the country is more likely to attract
the mobile capital, it will always prefer to play ti″. QED.
A.2. Proof of Lemma 2
If a country plays ti< t ̃i and all the mobile capital locates on its
territory, it will get a payoff which is less than what it gets when it
taxes at rate t ̂ and nomobile capital locates on its territory:Wi(ti, 1)<
Wi(t ̂, 0) for ti< t ̃i. QED.
A.3. Proof of Lemma 3
We already assessed that for any Ni≥Nj, it must be that tĩ≥tj̃. As
Lemma1 and Lemma2 apply for anyNi≥Nj, it follows that the strategies
of the countriesmust belong to the following intervals: ti∈ [tĩ, t]̂ and tj∈
[tj̃, t]̂.
We ﬁrst show that there is no symmetric (ti= tj) pure strategy
Nash equilibrium and then show that there is no asymmetric (ti≠ tj)
pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
(i) There is no symmetric (ti= tj) pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Since t ̃j≤ t ̃i< t ̂, a symmetric equilibrium is a pair (t, t) such that
t∈ [t ̃i, t ̂]. Consider such a strategy proﬁle (t, t).
If t> t ̃i, then the payoff of country i isWi =
1
2
Wiðt;1Þ + 1
2
Wiðt;0Þ
and that of j isWj = 1
2
Wjðt;1Þ + 1
2
Wjðt;0Þ. Clearly, this cannot be an
equilibrium as any country, say i, has an incentive to deviate to ti′=
t− ≥ t ̃i, causing all the capital to locate in i, and ensuring itself a
payoff Wi′=Wi(t− , 1)>Wi.
If t=tĩ, then the payoff of country i isWi =
1
2
Wið t˜i;1Þ + 12W
ið t˜i;0Þ
and that of j isWj = 1
2
Wjð t˜i;1Þ + 12W
jð t˜i;0Þ. Clearly, this cannot be an
equilibriumas ihas an incentive to deviate to ti′=t ̂ ensuring itself a payoff
Wi′=Wi(t,̂ 0)>Wi.21 The difference between the size of the largest country and that of the smallest of
course depends on the size of the elements of the sequence {Mt, Mt+1,…}.(ii) There is no asymmetric (ti≠ tj) pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
Without loss of generality, take the case of N1≥N2 so that
t ̃2≤ t ̃1< t ̂.
Consider a strategy proﬁle (t1, t2) with t ̃2≤t ̃1≤ t1< t2≤ t ̂. Given
those strategies, W1=W1(t1, 1) and W2=W2(t2, 0). Then, 2 has an
incentive to deviate to t2′= t1−  to obtain W2′=W2(t1− , 1)>
W2.
Consider a strategy proﬁle (t1, t2) with t ̃2≤ t ̃1< t2< t1≤ t ̂. Given
those strategies, W1=W1(t1, 0) and W2=W2(t2, 1). Then, 1 has an
incentive to deviate to t1′= t2−  to obtain W1′=W1(t2− , 1)>
W1.
Consider a strategy proﬁle (t1, t2) with t ̃2≤ t2≤ t ̃1≤ t1< t ̂ and
t1< t2. Given those strategies,W1=W1(t1, 0) and 1 has an incentive to
deviate to t1′= t ̂ to obtain W1′=W1(t ̂, 0)>W1.
Consider a strategy proﬁle (t1, t2) with t2̃≤ t2≤ t ̃1< t1= t ̂. Given
those strategies,W2=W2(t2, 1) and 2 has an incentive to deviate to
t2′= t ̂− to obtain W2′=W2(t ̂−, 1)>W2 for  small.
The generalization to the case of J countries with N1≥N2≥…≥NJ
is tedious but straightforward. This completes the proof. QED.
A.4. Proof of Proposition 1
Recall that because N1>N2>…>NJ−1>NJ, we have 0< t J̃< t ̃J−1<
…< t 2̃< t ̃1< t ̃. Also recall that the equilibrium strategies are:
◊ Countries j=1,…, J−2: Play t ̂ with probability qj=1.
◊ Country J−1: With positive probability qJ−1∈ [0, 1], plays t ̂; with
positive probability (1−qJ−1), plays the interval [t J̃−1, t ̂] with
continuous probability distribution HJ−1(t), with:
qJ−1 = 1−
WJð tˆ;1Þ−WJð t˜J−1;1Þ
WJð tˆ;1Þ−WJð tˆ;0Þ
" #
;
HJ−1ðtÞ =
½WJðt;1Þ−WJð t˜J−1;1Þ½WJð tˆ;1Þ−WJð tˆ;0Þ
½WJðt;1Þ−WJðt;0Þ½WJð tˆ;1Þ−WJð t˜J−1;1Þ
:
◊ Country J: Plays the interval [t ̃J−1, t ̂] with continuous probability
distribution HJ(t), with:
HJðtÞ =
WJ−1ðt;1Þ−WJ−1ð tˆ;0Þ
WJ−1ðt;1Þ−WJ−1ðt;0Þ :
We ﬁrst show that these strategies are actually equilibrium
strategies, and we then show that the equilibrium is unique.
The above strategies are such that all countries except the two
smallest ones (J−1 and J) put themselves out of the race to attract
mobile capital by taxing at rate t ̂ with probability one. Mobile capital
locates in country J−1 or J.
In equilibrium, the expected payoff of all countries (except J)
is equal to what they obtain when unable to attract mobile capital
and taxing immobile capital at the revenue-maximizing tax rate,
t ̂, i.e. the expected payoff for j=1,…, J−1 is Wj(t ̃j, 1)=Wj(t ̂, 0).
The sole country which does better is country J, the smallest
one. It obtains an expected payoff of WJ(t ̃J− 1, 1)>WJ(t ̃J, 1)=
WJ(t ̂, 0).
The proof that these strategies constitute an equilibrium is simply
that given the other countries' strategy, country j has no desire to
deviate.
To determine qJ−1, HJ−1(t), and HJ(t), the procedure is as
follows.
(A) Consider ﬁrst the payoffs for country J for some of its pure
strategies, given the strategy of country J−1. Note that since
the other countries always play t ̂, they have no impact on
the payoff of country J.
:9A.1 When country J plays t J̃−1, it obtains WJ(t ̃J−1, 1):
qJ−1W
Jð t˜J−1;1Þ + ð1−qJ−1Þ½HJ−1ð t˜J−1ÞWJð t˜J−1;0Þ
+ ð1−HJ−1ð t˜J−1ÞÞWJð t˜J−1;1Þ = WJð t˜J−1;1Þ:
A.2 For any t∈ [t J̃−1, t ̂], country J obtains:
qJ−1W
Jðt;1Þ + ð1−qJ−1Þ½HJ−1ðtÞWJðt;0Þ + ð1−HJ−1ðtÞÞWJðt;1Þ
Setting this last expression equal to WJ(t J̃−1, 1), to ensure that all
pure strategies yield the same payoff, we can solve for HJ−1(t):
HJ−1ðtÞ =
WJðt;1Þ−WJð t˜J−1;1Þ
ð1−qJ−1Þ½WJðt;1Þ−WJðt;0Þ
:
It is easily checked that HJ−1(t ̃J−1)=0. Using the fact that
limt→tĤJ−1(t)=1, we can solve for qJ−1 and obtain:
qJ−1 = 1−
WJð tˆ;1Þ−WJð t˜J−1;1Þ
WJð tˆ;1Þ−WJð tˆ;0Þ
" #
: ðA1Þ
Substituting this value ofqJ−1 inHJ−1(t) above,we get the following:
HJ−1ðtÞ =
½WJðt;1Þ−WJð t˜J−1;1Þ½WJð tˆ;1Þ−WJð tˆ;0Þ
½WJðt;1Þ−WJðt;0Þ½WJð tˆ;1Þ−WJð t˜J−1;1Þ
:
And it is easily checked that HJ−1(tJ̃−1)=0 and limt→tĤJ−1(t)=1.
(B) Consider now the payoffs for country J−1 for any of its pure
strategies, given the strategy of country J and that of the other
countries.
For any t∈ [t J̃−1, t ̂], country J−1 obtains:
HJðtÞWJ−1ðt;0Þ + ð1−HJðtÞÞWJ−1ðt;1Þ:
In equilibrium, this last expression must equalWJ−1(t ̂, 0) and we
can solve for Hj(t):
HJðtÞ =
WJ−1ðt;1Þ−WJ−1ð tˆ;0Þ
WJ−1ðt;1Þ−WJ−1ðt;0Þ :
Note that givenHj(t), country J−1 is indifferent between all its pure
strategies (it always obtains WJ−1(t,̂ 0)). In particular, country J−1
obtains the same expected payoff for any value of qJ−1. Country J−1
is therefore indifferent between putting and not putting some mass
on t ̂. Since country J−1 does put mass qJ− 1 on t ̂, then country J gets
WJ(t ̃J−1, 1)>WJ(t ̃J, 1).
We now show that the equilibrium is unique. Obviously, no other
equilibrium exists in which only two countries (other than J and J−1)
are playing tax rates below t ̂ with positive probability. We now show
that no equilibrium exists in which more than two countries play
strategy t ̂ with probability qj<1. We ﬁrst consider the case in which
the three smallest countries are active, and then extend our argument
to the case in which the Q (2<Q≤ J) smallest countries are active.
The case with three active countries: Imagine that in addition to
countries J and J−1, country J−2 also plays tax rates below t ̂ with
positive probability. By playing t ̂ with probability one, any country j
can always secure a payoffWj(t ̂, 0). If country J−2 is willing to play a
tax rate below t ̂ with positive probability, then it must be that the
associated expected payoff is at least WJ−2(t ̂, 0). If country J or J−1
are playing some tax rates less than t ̃J−2 in equilibrium, then, with
positive probability, country J−2 does not attract mobile capital
when playing t ̃J− 2, and obtains an expected payoff which is less thanWJ−2(t̃J−2, 1)=WJ−2(t,̂ 0). Country J−2 is therefore better off playing t ̂
with probability one. Thus, the only conﬁgurations that remain possible
are those in which all three countries play tax rates in [t̃J−2, t]̃. Then,
countries J and J−1 earn an expected payoff larger than Wj(t,̂0) when
playing tJ̃−2. Now let qj, j=J−2, J−1, J be the probability with which
country j plays t.̂ Clearly, it must be that qJ−1=qJ=0 since otherwise,
these two countries would earn a larger payoff when playing tJ̃−2 than
when playing t.̂ Indeed, when playing t,̂ there would be a chance of not
attracting mobile capital because other countries have qj>0. Thus,
because in a mixed strategy equilibrium, all pure strategies played
with positive probability must earn the same payoff, it must be that
qJ−1=qJ=0. Then, the only remaining conﬁguration is qJ−1=qJ=0
togetherwithqJ−2≥0.However, this conﬁguration is nomorepossible.
This is because qJ−2 must be used to ensure that country J is indifferent
between all its pure strategies t∈ [tJ̃−2, t]̂. But qJ−2 must be also be
used to ensure that country J−1 is indifferent between all its pure
strategies. Since qJ− 2 must take a unique value, at least one country
(J or J−1) will not be indifferent between all its pure strategies. Two
equations similar to equation (A1) would need to be satisﬁed simul-
taneously for both countries J and J−1 to be indifferent between all
their pure strategies. The two equations would be given by:
qJ−2 = 1−
WJð tˆ;1Þ−WJð t˜J−2;1Þ
WJð tˆ;1Þ−WJð tˆ;0Þ
" #
; ðA2Þ
qJ−2 = 1−
WJ−1ð tˆ;1Þ−WJ−1ð t˜J−2;1Þ
WJ−1ð tˆ;1Þ−WJ−1ð tˆ;0Þ
" #
: ðA3Þ
Satisfying both equations at the same time would require that
WJð tˆ;1Þ−WJð t˜J−2;1Þ
WJð tˆ;1Þ−WJð tˆ;0Þ
" #
=
WJ−1ð tˆ;1Þ−WJ−1ð t˜J−2;1Þ
WJ−1ð tˆ;1Þ−WJ−1ð tˆ;0Þ
" #
; ðA4Þ
which cannot be expected to be generically satisﬁed. Thus, an
equilibrium with three active countries is impossible.
The case with the Q (2<Q≤ J) smallest active countries: Imagine
that the Q smallest countries play tax rates below t ̂ with positive
probability. By the above argument, it must be that all these countries
are playing tax rates belonging to the interval [t ̃J−Q, t ̂], some of them
also playing t ̂with probability qj, j= J−Q, J−Q+1,..., J−1, J. Clearly,
it must be that qJ−Q+1=qJ−Q+2=...=qJ−1=qJ=0 since other-
wise, these Q−1 countries would earn a larger payoff when playing
t ̃J−Q than when playing t ̂. Indeed, when playing t ̂, there would be a
chance of not attracting mobile capital because other countries have
qj>0. Thus, because in a mixed strategy equilibrium, all pure strategies
played with positive probability must earn the same payoff, it must be
that qJ−Q+1=qJ−Q+2=...=qJ−1=qJ=0. The only remaining conﬁg-
uration is qJ−Q+1=qJ−Q+2=...=qJ−1=qJ=0 together with qJ−Q>0.
However, this conﬁguration is no more possible. This is because qJ−Q
must be used to ensure that Q−1 countries ( j=J−Q+1,..., J−1, J) are
indifferent between all their pure strategies t∈[tJ̃−Q, t]̂. Since qJ−Qmust
take a unique value, at least Q−2 countries will not be indifferent
between all their pure strategies. Thus, an equilibrium with Q>2 active
countries is impossible. This proves uniqueness. QED.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 2
We present the proof for the case of two identical countries. The
case of J>2 countries is a straightforward extension.
If the countries have the same number of local capital owners
(Ni=Nj), Proposition 2 states that the game has a symmetric mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium in which the two countries play t∈ [t ̃, t ̂]
10according to the continuous cumulative function H(t) and density
function h(t)=H′(t) on [t ̃, t ̂]. For t∈ [t ̃, t ̂], the mixed strategy H(t) is
given by:
HðtÞ = Wðt;1Þ−Wð tˆ;0Þ
Wðt;1Þ−Wðt;0Þ :
In equilibrium, the expected payoff of the two countries isW(t ̂, 0).
We show that when j plays the mixed strategy H(t), i has no
incentive to deviate from H(t).
Suppose j plays the mixed strategy H(t). Then, if i plays t′, mi=0
with probability H(t′) and mi=1 with probability 1−H(t′).
Before solving for the mixed strategy equilibrium, ﬁrst note that
there are no point masses in equilibrium when there are only two
identical countries. The intuition is simple: if the level of tax t′ was
played with positive probability, there would be a tie at t′ with
positive probability. Imagine then that country j decides to play t′− 
(instead of t′) with the same probability. The cost of such a deviation
would be of the order of ε, but if the two countries were to tie, then
country jwould gain a ﬁxed positive amount. The formal proof of this
is as follows. Imagine that country i plays t′ with positive probability
ω, and country j deviates from t′ to t′− with the same positive
probability. The payoff for country j will change by a factor of:
fPrðti < t′−ÞWðt′−;0Þ−Prðti < t′ÞWðt′;0Þg
+ fPrðti t′−ÞWðt′−;1Þ−Prðti t′ÞWðt′;1Þg
+ ωWðt′−;1Þ−ω
2
½Wðt′;1Þ + Wðt′;0Þg
:
The ﬁrst terms in curly brackets represent the difference between
losing with a tax level t′− , and losing with a tax level t′. As for the
second terms in curly brackets, they represent the difference between
winning with a tax level t′−, and winning with a tax level t′. It is
easy to see that the sum of those terms goes to zero when  goes to
zero. Now, the last terms in curly brackets represent the difference
between winning alone with t′− , and sharing the win with t′. Since
the sum of these terms is strictly positive when  goes to zero, it pays
to deviate to t′−  when there is a probability mass at t′. This implies
that H(t) cannot have a probability mass.22 And because the
cumulative function is continuous, cases in which the countries play
ti= tj (a tie) occur with probability 0.
We now solve forH(t) knowing that it must be continuous on [t ̃, t ̂].
Thus, given j plays H(t), when i plays the mixed strategy H(t), its
expected payoff is:
∫
t˜
tˆ ½HðzÞWðz;0Þ + ð1−HðzÞÞWðz;1ÞdHðzÞ:
For (H(t), H(t)) to be a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, it has to
be that all pure strategies played with positive probability yield the
same payoff. We construct the equilibrium so that the expected payoff
of the two countries is W(t ̂, 0). Thus, it has to be that:
HðtÞWðt;0Þ + ð1−HðtÞÞWðt;1Þ = Wð tˆ;0Þ∀t∈½ t˜; tˆ:
It follows that for t∈ [t ̃, t ̂], H(t) is given by:
HðtÞ = Wðt;1Þ−Wð tˆ;0Þ
Wðt;1Þ−Wðt;0Þ :22 Note that a different argument is required to show that there cannot be a
probability mass at t ̃. The argument goes as follows. Suppose that each country plays t ̃
with probability ω. There is then a positive probability that the countries will tie at t ̃
and earn a strictly dominated payoff: 1/2[W(t ̃, 1)+W(t ̃, 0)]<W(t ̂, 0). Thus, H(t)
cannot have a mass at t ̂.When j plays the mixed strategy H(t), i has no incentive to deviate
from H(t) because:
• Changing the probability of playing any t∈ [t ̃, t ̂] would not affect its
payoff as all pure strategies are equivalent by construction.
• Playing t∈[0, t]̃ or t∈[t,̂∞] with positive probability would decrease i's
expected payoff as these strategies are all dominated (Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2).
This completes the proof for the case of two identical countries. It
is easily shown that for the case of J>2 countries, either all countries
play a modiﬁed H(t) given by
HðtÞ = 1− Wð tˆ;0Þ−Wðt;0Þ
Wðt;1Þ−Wðt;0Þ
" #1= ðJ−Q−1Þ
:
or some of them (Q≤ J−2) put a unit mass on t ̂. QED.
A.6. Proof of Proposition 3
(A) We ﬁrst study the case of two countries, 1 and 2, with N1≥N2.
We start by examining the case in which country 2 plays ﬁrst. In that
case, the game has a pure perfect Nash equilibrium in which country 2
sets t2=t1̃ and country 1 sets t1=t ̂. In equilibrium, mobile capital
locates in 2 and the payoff of country 1 is W1(t ̂, 0) while that of
country 2 is W2(t 1̃, 1)>W2(t ̂, 0).
To see that this must be true, note that because country 2 has a
lower N2, it has a lower t ̃: t ̃2≤ t ̃1. Consequently, country 2 can always
and does undercut country 1 by setting t2=t1̃ (recall our breaking
rule). Country 1 then chooses the best tax rate available given it is
unable to compete, i.e the tax rate it chooses when isolated: t ̂.
Consider now the case in which country 1 plays ﬁrst. In that case,
the game has a pure perfect Nash equilibrium in which both countries
play t ̂. In equilibrium, mobile capital locates in 2 and the payoff of
countries 1 is W1(t ̂, 0) while that of country 2 is W2(t ̂, 1). To see that
this must be true, recall that country 1 can always be undercut by
country 2. Country 1 thus sets t1=t ̂ and country 2, beneﬁting from
the breaking rule, plays t2=t ̂.
This completes part (A) of the proof.
(B) The generalization of (A) to the case of J countries with
N1≥N2≥…≥NJ is straightforward. QED.
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